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Abstract
Technologies based on artificial intelligence (AI) can radically change the existing political para-
digm, empowering more diffused forms of political participation beyond elections—especially in
the emergent worldwide context of unrestricted disclosure of governmental data online. The ob-
jective of this research is to investigate how civil society can use AI-based technologies to em-
power political participation. A sample of 721 publications was conducted through a combination
of bibliometric analysis and systematic review, which revealed the characteristics and the nascent
state of literature. This was followed by an exploratory Case Study, conducted through in-depth
interviews and participant observation and supplemented by secondary materials. The content of
the Case Study was extensively and systematically analysed through textual coding. We depicted a
framework of how civil society can use AI-based technologies to nurture diffused political participa-
tion. This framework scrutinizes six focal areas and their respective dominant traits and descriptive
features, aiming at contributing to guiding academic studies and political endeavours.
Key words: Keywords: artificial intelligence; political participation; open-data; democracy; public administration
1. Introduction
Non-biological intelligent technologies—so-called Artificial
Intelligence (AI)—have proven to be highly pervasive within social,
technological and economic systems alike. Thanks to the ever-
continuing advances and diffusion of a constellation of intercon-
nected technologies—such as semiconductor chips, transistors, com-
puter processors, memory capacity, the World Wide Web, cloud
storage, big data analysis software and sophisticated neural
networks—AI has gained momentum to progressively shape socio-
technical system change (Schatsky et al., 2014; Kelnar, 2016;
Schwab, 2016; Huber, 2017; Makridakis, 2017). There has also
been a recent worldwide increase in disclosure of public data that
can be freely used, compared and shared, thereby improving trans-
parency and scrutiny of government activities and expenditures. AI-
related technologies and public open-data, when combined, can thus
reshape the existing political paradigm, opening up scope for more
diffused forms of political participation, beyond voting in sporadic
elections.
Political science recognizes the importance of citizen participa-
tion and public engagement to democratic processes (Pateman,
1970; Michels, 2011; Archibugi and Cellini, 2017); however, very
little is known about how AI-based technologies and the disclosure
of public data can empower civil society. The studies available in the
literature which deal with the relationship between political science
and AI are mainly focused on technical assistance to decision-
making procedures and on how AI-based technologies can be used
by existing governance structures (Milano et al., 2014).
This article addresses the following research question: how can
AI-based technologies be used to empower political participation?
We employed a multi-method approach, starting with the bibliomet-
ric analysis and systematic review of a sample of 721 documents.
This was followed by an exploratory Case Study, which is particu-
larly capable of providing unprecedented insights into a rather nas-
cent domain. This Case Study was conducted through in-depth
interviews and participant observation and subsequently supple-
mented by secondary materials. Content was extensively and sys-
tematically analysed through textual coding, resulting in a
framework on how AI can be used by civil society to empower more
diffused forms of political participation.
Beyond this introduction, the article is structured as follows.
Section 2 sets up our background literature, briefly presenting the con-
troversies regarding the impact of AI-based technologies on democ-
racy. Section 3 presents the research design of this article, including
how we collected, processed and analysed data to address our re-
search questions. This section also discusses the results of our biblio-
metric analysis and our literature review and briefly describes the
characteristics of our Case Study. Section 4 discusses how the use of
AI-based technologies, in a context of open-data, can empower new
VC The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 369
Science and Public Policy, 46(3), 2019, 369–380
doi: 10.1093/scipol/scy064
Advance Access Publication Date: 5 November 2018
Article
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/spp/article-abstract/46/3/369/5161215 by guest on 16 Septem
ber 2019
forms of diffused political participation in which citizens take more
ownership of public administration. Section 5 concludes the article,
describing its main contributions, limitations and possibilities for fu-
ture contributions.
2. Setting up the discussion: AI and democracy
There are many controversies regarding the impact of democracy on
development, innovation and economic development. It is common-
ly argued that places that are more diverse, tolerant and open to
new ideas have both more knowledgeable people (Florida, 2002)
and business ecosystems more prone to innovate and flourish
(Nelson, 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Technical progress
is indeed highly influenced by social institutions (Williams and
Edge, 1996) and political structures (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2000).
Therefore, the political configurations of a jurisdiction may alter its
propensity to create and diffuse new technologies. In this article, we
look at the opposite and rather neglected causal relation: techno-
logical development affecting democracy. We do this by focusing on
the role AI-based technologies can play in political participation.
About 20 years ago, Barber (1998: 575) raised the following
question: ‘has modern technology corrupted or improved our pol-
ity?’. It seems clear that ICT technologies enabled profound societal
changes and influenced the configuration of the so-called ‘know-
ledge societies’ (David and Foray, 2002) and ‘knowledge-based
economies’ (Foray and Lundvall, 1998). These technologies eased
communication, data sharing and tools for networking. More specif-
ically, the development of AI-powered technologies exponentially
augmented access to information of all sorts and created algorithms
capable of processing big data quickly and efficiently. This is the
case of machine learning, i.e. computer algorithms used to autono-
mously learn from data and information (Marr, 2016)
Studies have shown it would nonetheless be naı¨ve to adopt a
positivist approach towards technological development, one that
considers them to be value-neutral and a ‘one-track race to the fu-
ture’ (Savaget and Acero, 2017). Therefore, positive and negative
prospects of the influence of AI on democracy enhancement and
public empowerment should be further investigated. Table 1
presents two opposite scenarios, in a spectrum ranging from
Pandora (in which AI only has negative effects on democracy) and
Jeffersonian (in which AI only positively impacts democracy).
Deleterious effects of AI could occur, for example, if govern-
ments or powerful elites utilize new technologies for the purpose of
standardization, control or repression. Algorithms are able to under-
mine the fairness and quality of political discourse, and they reflect
the values of their designers and their intended uses (Mittelstadt,
2016). In fact, there are evidences that Bots—autonomous accounts
programmed to spread messages to create the illusion of public
support (Kollanyi (2016)—have been used in elections in the USA
(Bessi and Ferrara, 2016; Woolley, 2016; Cadwalladr, 2017;
Woolley and Guilbeault, 2017), Germany (Neudert et al., 2017), the
UK (Howard and Kollanyi, 2016; Cadwalladr, 2017), France
(Ferrara, 2017), and Brazil (Ruediger, 2017), to cite just a few.
Cyber troops (Bradshaw and Howard, 2017) deploy AI-powered
technologies to mislead public opinion, attempting to manipulate
citizens during election campaigns by shaping public discourse and
distorting political sentiment (Bradshaw and Howard, 2017;
Helbing et al., 2017; Polonski, 2017c, 2017a, 2017b).
Moreover, AI-based technologies can cause ‘resonance effect’,
that is, suggestions customized to each individual that are gradually
reinforced by repetition and lead to ‘filter bubbles’. Such large-scale
and intensive use of manipulative methods can generate social polar-
ization, opening up scope for the brutalization of behaviour in both
the digital and physical worlds, thus compromising social cohesion
(Helbing et al., 2017).
Alternatively, on the optimistic side of the spectrum—the
Jeffersonian Scenario—AI-based technologies could offer powerful
assistance to democracy by bringing disenfranchised citizens closer
to public administration. Political science literature recognizes that
citizen participation has positive effects on the quality of democracy
(Michels, 2011; Archibugi and Cellini, 2017). It would thus be desir-
able to open up scope for citizens to engage with political affairs, in-
stead of relying entirely on an elite of political representatives
chosen through sporadic elections (Pateman, 1970; MacPherson,
2012).
Accordingly, AI-based technologies permit marginalized people
in countries with many official languages to be empowered—for in-
stance, by providing them with automated translation tools to allow
them to vote (WWWF, 2017). This is the case in India, a multilin-
gual country with 22 official languages and many unofficial ones
also in use, where AI technologies have been used to overcome lan-
guage barriers (Khemani, 2012). During election campaigns, these
technologies can also engage voters and help them to be more and
better informed about key political issues (Polonski, 2017c), ‘over-
coming regional parochialism, local prejudice and national chauvin-
ism’ (Barber, 1998: 583) and increasing people’s voices in order to
make sure their claims are heard by elected representatives
(Polonski, 2017c). Furthermore, AI technologies can play an import-
ant role in extracting data from public blogs, forums and the press,
as well as help policy makers outline public opinion and controver-
sial issues, influencing policy planning and implementation (Milano
et al., 2014).
AI-based technologies in general, and machine learning, in par-
ticular, can be major drivers pulling civil society closer to public ad-
ministration by allowing citizens to tackle stable and predictable
problems for which large volumes of data are relatively easy to
Table 1. AI-based technologies in two opposite scenarios.
Pandora scenario Jeffersonian scenario
Definition* AI-based technologies can bring all evils to humanity
and weaken democracy.
AI-based technologies can bring all virtues to humanity
and enhance democracy.
Uses of AI-based
Technologies
Facilitates centralization of control over information
and communication; fake vocal political support on
social media; spread false messages to create the illu-
sion of public support; manipulate citizens during
election campaigns; reinforce ‘filter bubbles’, etc.
Permit marginalized people to join the democratic pro-
cess; engage voters and help them be more informed
about key political issues; increase people’s voices
and make sure their claims are heard by elected rep-
resentatives; auditing for transparency, etc.
Source: Authors’ own. Note: (*) denotes definitions based on Barber (1998).
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collect. This happens through what the OECD (2016) calls ‘applied
AI’: i.e. systems specialized to accomplish specific problem-solving,
hypothesis-driven tasks via allowing data processing at enormous
scales, hence accelerating the discovery of anomalies and patterns.
This scenario has become more promising with the sheer volume
of governmental open-data associated with the proliferation of AI-
based technologies and libraries (such as Google’s TensorFlow) and
online repositories for open-source coding projects (such as
GitHub). These have lowered barriers to entry and, consequently,
widened opportunities for developers around the world to engage
with public data. The open-data movement has grown considerably
since the Open Government Partnership, which welcomes more
than 70 countries, covers a third of the world’s population and has
resulted in over 2,500 governmental commitments to disclosing pub-
lic data. The idea of opening governmental data means public infor-
mation should be freely available to access, use, modify and share
without deliberate mechanisms of restriction or control1.
AI has the potential of deeply changing democracy for the better
or for the worse. Similar to other radical technologies—e.g. nuclear
power (Mackerron and Berkhout, 2009) and genetically modified
organisms (Millstone, 2007)—the diffusion of AI-based technologies
will likely become even more contentious. In other words, it can be
increasingly used both with malicious or beneficial intents, and its
outcomes can be differently perceived by society at large. It is thus
critical to shed light over what is changing, for what reasons, by
what means, and for the benefit of whom (Savaget and Acero,
2017).
Along these lines, this article focuses, specifically, on revealing
how AI-based technologies can be used to empower political partici-
pation beyond elections, bringing society closer to public adminis-
tration. The following section describes our research design,
including how we collected, processed and analysed data in order to
address our research question.
3. Research design
The discussion above shed light on the relationship between techno-
logical development and democratic enactment, but little is known
about how emerging technologies, such as AI, can lead to changes in
political regimes.
The contribution of this research thus stems from the investiga-
tion of the following question: how can AI-based technologies be
used to empower political participation? We addressed this question
through a stepwise, mixed-method process. We first conducted a
quantitative bibliometric study, which informed a systematic litera-
ture review aimed at revealing how our topic of interest has been
covered by academic publications. Based upon these results, we
investigated empirical data through a qualitative and exploratory
approach, which was capable of unpacking unprecedented insights
addressing our research question. The following subsections present
how we collected, processed and analysed our data.
3.1. Bibliometric analysis and systematic literature
review
We conducted a bibliometric review, a meta-analytical research of
literature (Kim and McMillan, 2008), to identify characteristics of
articles covering AI, such as the most cited authors, keywords men-
tioned, the journals in which they were published and the evolution
of the field over time (Bellis, 2009). This was a starting point to
guide a systematic literature review. Systematic reviews, if con-
ducted diligently, provide detailed coverage of scientific perspectives
while adopting a replicable and transparent process for inclusion or
exclusion of references and for analysis (Tranfield et al., 2003;
Pittway et al., 2004).
Data were initially collected, processed and analysed in January
2017. However, in order to incorporate the most up-to-date referen-
ces and theoretical trends, we updated our bibliometric study to-
wards the end of November 2017. We used the search string
‘Artificial Intelligence’ to reveal all papers available on the Web of
Science database, resulting in a sample of 6,773 records. These were
then filtered according to academic disciplines provided by Web of
Science to exclude the ones unlikely to cover topics related to our re-
search question. The results are provided in Table 2.
The 727 publications were written in seven languages: English,
Spanish, French, German, Russian, Czech and Norwegian. The six
papers written in Russian, Czech and Norwegian were excluded
from our sample, due to our own language barriers. We then pro-
ceeded with bibliometric analysis of the remaining 721 documents.
This process revealed several characteristics of the literature; among
the most relevant were:
i. the evolution of the field over time;
ii. the geographic dispersal of publications; and
iii. the main areas of coverage.
We used the open source software Hammer to conduct the statis-
tical and network analysis functions (Knutas et al., 2015). The
resulting dataset was then analysed with Microsoft Excel. Figure 1
portrays the tumultuous trajectory of the number of AI publications
since the first one, dated in 1962. The number progressed slowly
until the end of the 1970s, mostly due to the British and U.S. govern-
ments cutting budgets for exploratory research (Crevier, 1993). In
the 1980s, AI research gained strength thanks to the commercial
success of expert systems, i.e., methods that simulated the analytical
skills of human experts. However, the number of AI publications
fell once again into a longer hiatus, until the 2010s. Although dis-
puted, this lapse has been attributed to the collapse of the Lisp
Machine market in 1987 (McCorduck, 2004). The trend reversed
abruptly in 2015. According to Clark (2015), this was a landmark
year because of the rapid development and wide diffusion of AI-
related technologies and techniques, such as machine learning and
neural networks.
Figure 2 shows the most common geographical location of
authors. It is important to highlight that we could only track this in-
formation for a subsample of 500 of our original sample of 721. The
USA presents almost three times the number of publications as does
the UK, which is second in the ranking. The predominance of the USA
is not surprising, since it has the most funding for AI research in the
world and is the country of origin of several companies developing re-
cent AI-based technologies, such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, and
other tech giants (MGI, 2017). The UK has almost twice the number
of Chinese publications on AI. The origins of AI can be traced back to
Turing’s pioneering theory of computation in the UK during the
Second World War, which might justify the widespread number of
British publications throughout our studied timespan. The Chinese
number of publications, on the other hand, is much more concen-
trated but has been growing rapidly since the 2010s.
Figure 3 presents the most popular keywords. Most of them are
techniques applied to AI, such as fuzzy logic, artificial neural net-
works, genetic algorithm, and data mining. It also presents
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applications of AI to enhance efficiency and optimize operations,
such as for robotics and wind energy, or to assist decision-making.
There are just two popular keywords closely related to politics (‘pol-
itical science’ and ‘political simulation’), which belong to papers
that mainly deal with how AI-based technologies can be used to aid
existing governance and policymaking processes (Milano et al.,
2014).
After concluding the bibliometric analysis, the abstracts of all
the 721 documents within our sample were thoroughly analysed to
understand how the relationship between AI and political participa-
tion has been covered from 1962 (the date of the first publication on
the topic) to 2017. Surprisingly, none of them mentioned political
participation. The ones covering topics related to politics or policy-
making shied away from describing the influence of AI over demo-
cratic regimes and did not approach how civil society can use AI to
take more active roles in political affairs. This observation influ-
enced our choice for a qualitative and rather exploratory approach,
which is detailed next.
3.2. Case study methodology
The bibliometric analysis and systematic literature review revealed
that the relationship between AI and political participation is a nas-
cent domain. Our research was consequently designed according to
the lack of plausible existing theory (Edmondson and McManus,
2007). This phenomenon is not only under-researched, but it is also
Table 2. Overview of literature search.
Search String Database Filter by discipline Results
Artificial Intelligence Web of Science Multidisciplinary Science 215
Management 187
Social Sciences Interdisciplinary 83
History/Philosophy of Science 76
Business 67
Economics 62
Social Issues 42
Green/Sustainable Science/Technology 28
Political Science 25
Sociology 24
Total 727
Source: Authors’ own. Data sourced from Web of Science.
Figure 1. Number of publications by year. Source: Authors’ own. Data sourced fromWeb of Science.
Figure 2.Most common geographical locations of authors. Source: Authors’ own. Data sourced fromWeb of Science.
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context-dependent and open-ended. We therefore deploy inductive
and qualitative methods (Gill and Johnson, 2002) to provide a deep
and detailed comprehension of the investigated phenomena through
a Case Study (Yin, 2008), which is particularly capable of unpacking
novel insights to build theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The
Case Study was chosen based on uniqueness and on its potential to
generate novel propositions that can be further investigated,
explained, and validated.
We collected data through a combination of different techniques,
namely exploratory interviews, participant observation, and docu-
ment analysis. Data were in both Portuguese and English and
include:
i. approximately 9 h of interviews with the participants of the
Case Study;
ii. participant observation data gathered by monitoring the discus-
sions of more than 500 collaborators through GitHub2 and
Telegram Messenger3; and
iii. open-source materials made available by the participants
involved, mostly through the online platforms GitHub and
Medium4.
We conducted interviews via Skype in an exploratory and semi-
structured fashion (Robson, 2002), focusing on open-ended enqui-
ries as well as subjective perspectives of the involved participants on
motivations, prospects, and key determinants that would enable the
participation of civil society in political affairs. Interviews were con-
ducted individually with six key participants in order to prevent
power plays constraining data collection, and these have been here-
by anonymously identified with randomly assigned numbers (i.e. P1,
P2. . .P6) to ensure confidentiality. Events were viewed from mul-
tiple informants’ perspectives and via complex and interconnected
variables, clarified through interpretation and contextualization of
their perspectives.
Participant observation was a complementary technique to the
exploratory interviews, allowing the researchers to perceive reality
from the viewpoint of someone observing from within rather than
from an external viewpoint. It was thus possible to contrast these
observations with the ones portrayed by the interviewees to best de-
scribe interactions and untold stories (Yin, 2008). We also made use
of secondary materials to fill gaps when primary data did not suf-
fice, as well as to shed light on informants’ communication with
broad audiences and third parties.
After finishing data collection, we fully transcribed the inter-
views and analysed their content with the assistance of Nvivo5 soft-
ware. Content analysis is recommended for analysing written
communication through thematic interpretation of a given text by
attentively reading documents to code relevant extracts (Weber,
1990) and, as a result, provide a condensed description of patterns.
As this is exploratory research, we coded data without the support
of previously established nodes and categories. Instead, these
emerged during content analysis and were reframed and contrasted
throughout the process. We also triangulated them between the
authors of this article to minimize bias. The content analysis was
combined with observations arising from both secondary materials
and participant observation. We then compiled extracts for each
relevant theme, unpacking novel insights that were related back to
the research question and to the existing literature.
3.2.1 The case
According to data sourced from the World Bank, Brazil had the
ninth highest GDP in the world in 2016. In the same year, it was
ranked 76th in Transparency International’s Corruption Index (TI,
2017). A study done by FIESP (2010) revealed that the average an-
nual cost of corruption in Brazil ranges from 1.4 to 2.3 percent of its
GDP. If these numbers are accurate, the cost of corruption in Brazil
could potentially reach up to USD 53 billion per year.
In 2011, the Brazilian government passed the Information
Access Law6, which makes open data compulsory for all public
bodies. This led to the emergence of institutional mechanisms lever-
aging the use of open data to encourage democratic participation
and to tackle corruption. Nonetheless, open data in Brazil is still
underutilized, and anticorruption enforcement is weak. Efforts to
translate the increasingly available data into understandable infor-
mation that can guide practical actions are still incipient (Iglesias,
2017).
While major corruption schemes are progressively under the in-
vestigation of the responsible governmental agencies, other kinds of
inappropriate expenses are harder to assess and investigate, requir-
ing human and technological efforts that go beyond the current cap-
acity of investigative bodies. This includes the so-called Quota for
Parliamentary Activity, or QPA (Cota para o Exercı´cio da Atividade
Parlamentar, CEAP7), a fund that spends up to approximately USD
15 thousand a month8 to reimburse each congressperson for meals,
flights, fuel, car rentals and other routine payments incurred while
performing their parliamentary activities. The team responsible for
receiving and processing reimbursement claims in the Lower House
of the Congress receives an average of 20 thousand receipts per
month. The process of checking each receipt is manual, leaving
room for mistakes and corruption to pass undetected.
Figure 3. The 10 most popular keywords. Source: Authors’ own. Data sourced fromWeb of Science.
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In 2016, a multidisciplinary group of individuals started an open
and autonomous project named ‘Operac¸~ao Serenata de Amor’
(OSA)9, which deploys AI-based technologies in order to empower
civic auditing of public administration. These technologies were
developed to analyse and report potentially inappropriate public
expenses, starting with the QPA. After raising over USD 20 thou-
sand through a crowdfunding campaign to kick-start the project, the
group created an open source AI robot, known as ‘Rosie’, that uses
algorithms to automatically read receipts claimed through the QPA;
it then calculates the probability of irregularities and justifies its
conclusions.
The deployment of AI involves a deductive, hypothesis-driven
method that learns and improves itself throughout the process. OSA
creates hypotheses according to the understanding of the specificities
of the QPA laws and by examining the dataset, then identifying po-
tential sources of inappropriate public expenses. Hypotheses in-
clude, to cite a few, over-invoicing, reimbursements issued by bogus
companies, and expenses with products/services that are not speci-
fied (or allowed) by the law.
Thanks to AI’s continuous developments, OSA is able to gather,
process and analyse an incredible amount of data that are openly
available. These are used to run plausible hypotheses and find
anomalies in thousands of reimbursement claims. Independently of
congresspeople’s political affiliations, all anomalies are reviewed by
the OSA team and reported to the responsible governmental body,
following the procedure established by the Information Access Law.
The responsible authority analyses each report and, if it agrees with
the legitimacy of the complaint submitted, the congressperson has to
justify the expense and/or give the money back.
Approximately 6 months after deploying AI to investigate the
QPA, more than 8 thousand potentially irregular expenses were
identified, and 629 of them—exposing 216 of the 513 congresspeo-
ple at the time—were reported to the responsible authorities.
OSA has a team of eight staff, horizontally coordinated and
working from different geographical locations both within and out-
side Brazil, whose expenses are covered through crowdfunding.
Furthermore, as the entire project is open source, OSA also works
with a group of more than 500 volunteers interacting through social
media, such as GitHub and Telegram, to improve Rosie’s algorithms
and to assist in easing the mechanisms of reporting irregular
expenses, in order to meet the bureaucratic procedure established by
Brazilian law.
The algorithms and results are fully open, meaning anyone can
contribute to their development, access results online, or assist with
analysis and reporting. Besides the formal complaints, OSA also
publicizes irregularities through online social media, such as
Medium, Twitter, and Facebook (on which they have thousands of
followers), allowing the media and the general public to be informed
and to contact a given congressperson to ask for clarification. Over
70 media channels have already reported results from this project
(P4). The OSA team plans to scale up to investigate reimbursement
claims from the Brazilian Senate, public procurement of the
Brazilian federal government and public administration of Brazilian
cities, as well as expand to international jurisdictions that have also
implemented open-data policies.
The ultimate goal is to ‘use technology to empower political
change’ (P1) by promoting civic auditing of the public administra-
tion. According to P1, ‘we do not claim we are fighting corruption,
which is a very broad, confrontational and imprecise term. We are
assisting society to have more control of public expenses, to keep
track of how public money is being used’. Besides revealing an
unprecedented number of potentially irregular expenses to the re-
sponsible authorities and observing the increasing awareness and en-
gagement of a society that has been disenfranchised from political
participation beyond voting in elections, OSA measures its success
by when congresspeople respond to these claims publicly and when
irregular expenses are recognized and paid back. Indirect impacts in-
clude, for example, a vast number of collaborators who are
learning-by-doing about AI while engaging with OSA, hence
improving their professional outlooks. As OSA strictly follows an
open-code policy, other groups might use their technologies and
knowledge for other purposes, potentially spilling over to existing
industries and indirectly assisting the generation of new endeavours.
4 Results and discussion
In this section, we draw from the Case Study and the literature re-
view, firstly discussing how the use of AI-based technologies, in a
context of open-data, can empower citizens to take more ownership
of public administration. This is followed by the presentation of a
framework to describe the focal areas, predominant traits and key
features of a diffused political participation enabled by AI. We con-
clude this section by presenting the main challenges and limitations
of AI-enabled political participation.
4.1 Open-data and AI
Despite being made available online, ‘datasets are often difficult to
be fully digested and comprehended by the civil society’ (P3). As
described by P2, ‘movements of democratic accountability and
transparency revolve around making data available, but it does not
mean data is being made accessible to the society at large (. . .). [The
civil society] can and should directly benefit from the achievements
of the open data movement’.
The case of Brazil demonstrates that there are powerful vested
interests constraining the use of data for enforcement of anticorrup-
tion policies. It also shows institutional resistance to deploying
cutting-edge technologies to process enormous datasets, which cur-
rently are often processed manually by understaffed and under-
budgeted governmental agencies or non-profits.
AI thus opens up unprecedented mechanisms for civil society to
process underutilized datasets and explore participatory mecha-
nisms that influence political activities. As described by P1, ‘not only
should technology be used by whom is providing information, but
also by the ones who should be consuming this information’.
The case of OSA shows the pioneering use of AI-based technolo-
gies to audit public expenses. These are both conducted and funded
by civil society groups in Brazil and hold possibilities of being
adapted to (or even replicated in) other countries.
There are other initiatives of Brazilian civil society that do not
use AI, ‘composed by experts who do everything manually, trying to
identify outliers and then going, for each potential case of corrup-
tion, through dozens of websites and formal processes to obtain and
contrast data. It is like finding a needle in a haystack’ (P1).
Conversely, through deploying AI, efficiency grows exponentially. A
civil servant responsible for auditing governmental expenses told P2
that OSA ‘in a week revealed more suspicious claims than what the
responsible governmental agency did in a year’. Cases such as that
of OSA are nonetheless very rare around the world. Learning from
this insightful case sheds light on how civil society groups can de-
ploy modern technologies in general and AI in particular to nurture
social control of public expenses and, more broadly, to promote
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political participation beyond choosing political representatives in
sporadic elections.
4.2 Applied AI for diffused political participation
Based upon OSA’s case and our literature review, we summarized
the key characteristics of how civil society can deploy AI to take
more ownership of public administration. Table 3 describes six focal
areas, their dominant traits and 23 probable features characterizing
them.
4.2.1 Funding
Deploying AI to tackle governmental problems by tapping into
emerging open-data contexts has low barriers to entry. However,
citizen-led initiatives will still need funding both to kick-start new
projects and to scale-up existing ones. Funding is needed, not only
to purchase eventual technologies and licenses, but also to allow
citizens—especially ICT geeks—to dedicate their time to designing
and running these projects.
Funding arising directly from governments could potentially de-
legitimize these initiatives, even if following rigid and transparent
ethical procedures. Reputational risks notwithstanding, public fund-
ing for technology-intensive services, such as AI-auditing of public
expenses, are very scarce, especially in developing regions such as
Brazil. Public procurement tends to be keener on focusing exclusive-
ly on very mature technologies and to be influenced by vested inter-
ests, which are opposed to the very purpose of these initiatives. For
these reasons, initiatives such as OSA are prone to be funded in a
very decentralized fashion, mostly by civil society itself.
Crowdfunding has proven to be particularly good at kick-
starting technology-intensive projects, and, in this case, it also
empowers civil society to participate and to join the project,
building up momentum for positive and collective change.
According to P2, not only was crowdfunding very helpful for fund-
ing, but also ‘to push our initiative to create and to test a concept’,
similar to the creation of an open and easily comprehended business
plan that would be presented to potential funders. P1 emphasized
that crowdfunding ‘promotes autonomy, both to people who are
leading the project and to the ones supporting the project’. At the
same time, it nurtures ‘micro-communities and it deals better with
the lack of trust of the civil society’ (P1) towards governments and
large organizations.
After kick-starting, these initiatives can use recurring crowdfund-
ing, in which donors commit a certain monthly amount to the pro-
ject. P3 emphasized that this posits a pressure to keep up, to
perform well and to constantly present results. However, this source
of funding is unlikely to meet all expenses, especially when incre-
mentally expanding the initiative towards new jurisdictions or add-
ing new functionalities. Donations and grants from third sector
organizations, such as private foundations, or wealthy individuals
can fill this gap, but these are unlikely to be obtained to kick-start
novel projects led by diffused civil society groups. Once the results
are unpacked and the initiative gains more support and visibility, it
becomes better positioned to apply for grants and donations. Similar
to crowdfunding, grants often come with strings attached. On one
hand, a grant does not provide permanent stability to the initiative
and financial security to its most engaged members, but it sets mod-
els in the form of discrete projects, from design to implementation
of these initiatives, with the potential to be replicated or adapted
elsewhere.
Financial security is indeed an important matter for the develop-
ment of these initiatives. P2 declared, ‘we cannot work full-time for
free (. . .) but we cannot let OSA die either’. This idea was endorsed
by all other interviewees. The case shows that a possible solution is
in-parallel for-profit services to clients demanding AI solutions. The
core team created a company, hoping to raise enough revenue
streams through in-parallel services to sponsor most of their
expenses with OSA. The latter would still be kept as an open-
source, not-for-profit project. It is interesting to observe that, after
starting OSA, the core members not only benefitted from it by using
the project as a ‘lab’ to experiment and develop their AI skills, but
also improved the outlook of their resumes and gained credibility
enough to start a company with a proven track record and portfolio.
4.2.2 Governance
Horizontal governance is not only desirable, but also a matter of
analytical rigor, if dealing with open-source initiatives to empower
civil society. Horizontality does not mean a lack of goals and formal
ethical standards. The OSA case has shown, for example, that, when
integrating a wide range of collaborators, the initiative might risk
shying away from its main targets or adopting a rather aggressive,
confrontational approach that could undermine the credibility of
the project (P1, P2, P4).
Ethical standards and goals need to be explicit and shared among
all collaborators. In the case of OSA, it was critical to emphasize
that the initiative does not aim at fighting corruption, but rather at
empowering civil society to take more ownership of public adminis-
tration. Otherwise, as described by P1, ‘a collaborator can hack pri-
vate details of a potentially corrupt politician, such as his address,
and start sending pizzas to his house. However, this is not what we
want to do (. . .). We do not want to make the lives of politicians a
hell and shame them in public arenas’.
Table 3. Key characteristics of diffused political participation
enabled by AI.
Focal areas Dominant traits Descriptive features
Funding Decentralized Crowdfunding
Third sector and individuals
In-parallel for-profit services
Governance Horizontal Ethics and clear goals
Organizational culture
Workflow
Curate and review
Partnerships
Human Resources Diverse Multidisciplinary
Sofa activism
Safety net
Operations Lean Fill gaps
‘Small is beautiful’
System flow
Pilot and experiment
Immediacy, practicality
and malleability
Public relations Openness Funding accountability
Open code
Legality and liability
Report findings
Scaling up Distributed Replicability
Adaptability
Spill-over
Source: Authors’ own.
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The OSA case also demonstrates the importance of ensuring an
organizational culture based on trust, as well as a tolerant, diverse
and collaborative organizational culture. P5, for example, empha-
sized that she does not ‘like working in environments where I feel
affected for being a woman, and this happens a lot in technology
(. . .). I could be doing millions of other things, working for a large
company, but they are often misogynist, and I feel comfortable and
respected working at OSA’. P6 described that ‘social control of the
government was never something very dear to my heart (. . .). I
wanted to work with data analysis, and the team members know a
lot. Working with governmental data came as a cherry on the top of
the cake. My main incentive though is learning’.
One of the most challenging features of horizontal governance,
with the team performing fluid roles and working remotely and flex-
ibly, is managing workflow. The OSA case has shown the import-
ance of maintaining stable communication. According to P6, ‘we
have daily meetings, at 9 am, lasting 15 min each. The idea is to pre-
sent what you did the day before, what you will do today, and to tell
if you need something (. . .). With this brief communication, we
know what is being done, by whom, and when it will be delivered’.
As emphasized by P5, in these meetings, ‘we do not have to ask for
permission, the main concern is not if I can do something, but rather
if I should do it’. They also use two other techniques, well-known
among programmers. One is called time-boxing, in which a fixed
maximum time period, or ‘time box’, is allocated to each planned
activity, and, ‘if that time was not enough, you skip that task and
still go to the following one’ (P5). The other consists of remote pair-
ing, in which two programmers in different locations work together
on a task, using tools such as a collaborative real-time editor, shared
desktop and time markers—’not to tell how many hours per day you
have to work, but rather to show your availability to perform that
task’ (P5). Besides improving team satisfaction, knowledge sharing
and reduction of code defects, pair programming is particularly ad-
vantageous for exploratory tasks involving emerging technologies,
such as AI, in which programmers might not know beforehand what
the process will entail (Cockburn and Williams, 2001; Lui and
Chan, 2006).
It is also critical to ensure a process of reviewing codes and curat-
ing analytical content, especially from new or infrequent collabora-
tors. P1 described that OSA has an implemented system of code
review, in which ‘we read the code from all collaborators, to identify
if there is a loophole, if it makes sense mathematically, and if it is co-
herent with the hypothesis (. . .) as there are barriers that are techno-
logical, but also ones that are related to legal knowledge’. It is also
important to curate analytical content. P1 illustrated with a case in
which ‘I gave a feedback to an analysis that used the language of
‘criminal’ to refer to the politician. Nevertheless, we are only dealing
with suspicious things, we are not the judicial system. Then I
explained we are talking about statistics, probabilities, hence we
need to use the language of suspicious expenses’.
Partnerships are very important. In the beginning, they tend to
happen mostly with given individuals acting as mentors who are
willing to share knowledge and expertise on critical and complemen-
tary topics. OSA consulted with three individual mentors with very
different expertise when kick-starting: a specialist in open-data and
data science, a lawyer who helps identify legal processes and liabil-
ities of OSA’s operations and another who helps with fundraising.
After kick-starting, the project is better positioned to interact with
mainstream agents, including members of non-profits working to-
wards similar purposes and employees of governmental bodies
auditing public expenses. These partners are very important and
‘helped identifying the best pathways to pursue, where the bottle-
necks are’ (P2). However, especially within the government, ‘some
of them might not want to identify themselves’ (P3) in order to avoid
political clashes and retaliation. Therefore, support tends to be indi-
vidualized rather than institutionalized.
4.2.3 Human resources
Empowering civil society through AI-based technologies also implies
cultivating a diverse pool of human resources. This allows the team
to redefine problems outside rigid disciplinary boundaries and focus
on finding complementarities. As a result, it improves the likelihood
of coping with changing political scenarios, deploying emerging and
uncertain technologies and approaching complex multi-stakeholder
situations. Although the majority of team members have program-
ming knowledge, the OSA case clearly shows how they deliberately
involved other, complementary skills, such as administrative, jour-
nalistic, and legal ones. Besides better end results, P5 emphasized
better internal and external communication—for example, as laws
‘are difficult to understand, written by lawyers and for lawyers, we
created a simple version, that anyone can understand, by summariz-
ing what can be done and what cannot’. P6 also described ‘we are
constantly learning from others and, as we recognize skills and ap-
preciate different inputs, decision-making happens without
conflicts’.
The citizens programming AI algorithms are likely to be from
the so-called millennial generation, which is marked by being very
urban, having an increased familiarity with digital technologies and
presenting a more liberal approach towards politics. This generation
is also more prone to adopt a ‘sofa activist approach’ towards polit-
ical engagement. Critics have characterized this behaviour by label-
ling them ‘slacktivist’. UNAIDS (2010: 143), for example, described
slacktivists as people who support causes by performing simple,
‘feel-good’ measures instead of being ‘truly engaged or devoted to
making a change’. However, as highlighted by P1, ‘sofa activism
might not be as useless as it seems (. . .). OSA was done entirely by
people on different sofas. I was programming while sitting on my
sofa with my dog underneath my feet’.
In order to leverage this generational and rather international
culture, it seems critical to use open-source and open-code tools, as
well as to develop codes and conduct most technical communication
in English. As emphasized by P4, ‘we had to opt between a few peo-
ple who know how to program but do not speak English, or people
in the entire world seeing and potentially collaborating’. It is also
very important to manage these communities. As described by P1,
‘we give them an explanatory map, like the one you receive when
you go to the museum with the galleries (. . .) and show what we
understand as good practices’. P5 emphasized the need for ‘non-vio-
lent communication’, since ‘we are dealing with an open group [for
political engagement], and we will not expel anyone’. Coding sprints
have also proven, according to P6, to be very beneficial in building
up momentum and engaging people who cannot steadily work on
the project. These sprints consist of getting developers to work on a
given project for a set period of time, often a weekend.
Furthermore, consistent with literature on entrepreneurship [e.g.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)], the participants, especially the
ones who are fully dedicated to kick-starting these projects, are like-
ly to have a safety net. When basic needs are met, such as housing
and food, it is easier to be creative, to take risks and to renounce sta-
ble jobs in order to pursue more pleasurable professional options. In
the beginning, OSA was led by people who were more affluent than
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the population’s average and who knew, that if OSA did not suc-
ceed, they would not face socioeconomic deprivation. As highlighted
by P1 and P2, OSA started as a project they conducted in their free
time, and then they decided to take the risk and dedicate themselves
fully to making it work. P6 accordingly said that ‘OSA is something
I will work on, earning money or not. If it ends, I’d eventually have
to search for something else, but OSA will still be part of my daily
routine, because I do it for pleasure’.
4.2.4 Operations
Initiatives to empower political participation through AI might be fi-
nancially constrained and count on little institutional support before
kick-starting. The team is scattered among multiple geographical
locations, contributions are fully transparent, and barriers to entry
and to scaling up these initiatives to other jurisdictions are low. For
these reasons, operations focus on filling existing gaps, or finding
the highest returns for minimal effort. OSA, for example, identified
that the responsible auditing authorities are already putting great ef-
fort into revealing grand corruption schemes, such as the ones
involving public procurement. According to P1, these agencies are
‘doing it well, and we need to understand that to avoid overlaps and
time loss’. However, they cannot investigate suspicious expenses
that are relatively small, as the amount of investigations would be
too high to be done manually. P2 described being told by an employ-
ee of an auditing agency that ‘expenses lower than approximately
USD 25 thousand cannot be properly investigated. If agencies look
at big, we [OSA] can look at small, and then citizens will not have
blind spots’. AI-based technologies could thus fill this gap while con-
comitantly building up momentum to mobilize civil society to take
more active political roles.
The expression ‘small is beautiful’ was coined by Schumacher
(1973) and shed light on how technologies should be appropriated
to empower people. We are hereby paraphrasing Schumacher
(1973) to describe how AI-based technologies can be best used to
empower citizens to participate in politics. At least in the initial
stages, it seems that AI should be people-centred and used to fill
gaps, such as small irregular expenses that pass unnoticed by audit-
ing agencies but whose data is openly available. As described by P2,
‘we want to put the citizens in the conversation (. . .), to debate the
use of public money. Not only the bombastic political news. . . We
want them to think about the day-to-day of politics, the expenses
happening on Monday, to let them interact directly with the
politician’.
It also seems critical to tap into potential leverage points of the
system, i.e., places within complex systems where a small shift in
one thing can produce big changes in everything (Meadows, 2009).
OSA identified, for example, that, while highlighting individual ir-
regular expenses signals potential wrongdoings of politicians and
mobilizes routine political participation, these spotlights have little
potential to cause short-term stress in the dominant political system.
By grouping thousands of inappropriate expenses together, OSA
could then amplify its capacity to advocate for changes in the legisla-
tion, so as to eliminate what they consider to be spurious or un-
necessary public benefits to politicians on the grounds ‘that they
have been systematically misused’ (P1).
Similar to the design and implementation process of business
model innovations, pioneering initiatives employing AI to empower
political participation are more likely to succeed if they prototype,
pilot and experiment. It is particularly critical to learn, test and val-
idate concepts and variables in early stages, as well as to rollout
endeavours (Chesbrough, 2010). As described by P2, OSA ‘did a
pre-analysis of the data even before launching the crowdfunding to
be sure ‘there were wrong things there that can be found’. Then the
first round of crowdfunding was mostly to develop the concept even
further and to validate our assumption that a robot could audit pub-
lic expenses’. This shares similarities with an established business
model literature that has seen exponential growth via the wide diffu-
sion of the concept of ‘Lean Startup’ (Ries, 2011).
In a time when information is increasingly more diffused, decen-
tralized, and fast-paced, technology-intensive operations promoting
transparency, accountability, and political participation should as-
pire to immediacy and practicality. As described by P1, ‘there are
lots of complex theoretical criticism to representative democracy,
but in practice change happens only by trial-and-error, experiment-
ing to see what is effective and what is not’. Practicality is also evi-
dent in the choice of the QPA to kick-start the project: ‘we could
start with it, because the database was very organized and very
transparent’ (P4). OSA’s immediacy derives from the fact that it is a
financially unstable initiative and mostly composed of millennials,
who are more likely to commit to pursuing short-term outcomes:
‘we had to promise something that people would see results in as lit-
tle as 2 months’ (P2).
4.2.5 Public relations
The term ‘public relations’ is often used to describe a means of
establishing and maintaining connections with target audiences.
However, in the case of initiatives empowering political participa-
tion, the public is not merely an audience. Instead of only reporting
to them, these initiatives should aim at constantly integrating civil
society into their processes. The OSA case has shown how openness
and transparency permeate their relationships with different civil so-
ciety groups. Their bookkeeping is openly available to society at
large, and most especially those who donated through
crowdfunding.
A very important characteristic of OSA is that all their codes are
openly available on GitHub to potential collaborators or to those
who want to verify the results they find. OSA not only taps into a
vast pool of collaborators to develop their AI, but also, by keeping
their initiatives transparent, they are better shielded from criticism.
As described by P1 ‘if we did not have open-code, we could easily be
labelled and delegitimized as leftist, or rightist, or serving interests
of conspirators’.
Following legal procedures is essential to avoid liabilities that
can undermine or even obliterate initiatives empowering political
participation, possibly directly compromising the lives of those ac-
tively involved. The OSA case demonstrates that they have to be
careful with how results are reported and the language used in order
to, for example, avoid legal suits of defamation after publicly expos-
ing politicians’ names. To circumvent this liability, OSA first reports
suspicious expenses to public authorities; then, after receiving their
responses, the information can be fully disseminated, as the team’s
work is backed up by an official public response.
Besides anticipating liabilities, initiatives should aim to expand
the reach of their reporting and to expand scope for direct involve-
ment of citizens. OSA reports findings through online social net-
works, such as Facebook and Twitter, and often gets coverage by
the media. The former has been progressively more important in
allowing civil society to engage with everyday politics: for example,
by contacting politicians to request justifications. Outreach through
media is also relevant, since traditional broadcasting has more
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outreach to those excluded from online social networks (i.e., the eld-
erly, members of lower social strata and residents of remote geo-
graphical locations). P4 emphasized their ‘commitment with
ensuring the media will always publish the entire data’. In other
words, OSA only assists media channels if they commit to publish-
ing the data as they were received, thus avoiding the use of OSA’s
results to privilege vested political interests of media corporations.
4.2.6 Scaling up
When initiatives empowering political participation through AI are
open-code and fully transparent, there is no ownership involved,
and, consequently, possibilities of scaling up become fundamentally
distributed. Expansion is difficult to track, since initiatives do not
need to directly involve the original team: anyone, in principle, can
build upon openly available contributions. In the case of scaling up
OSA’s experiences, for example, virtually every public expense can
be audited by civil society, so long as there is a governmental open-
data policy. As phenomena like OSA are still rare, little is known
about how scaling up these initiatives can occur. However, the OSA
team has identified at least three potential pathways: replicating,
adapting, or spilling-over.
OSA can be replicated, for example, by using AI in similar con-
texts and with the same purposes. An example is scaling up coverage
from expenses of politicians in the lower house to include those of
the upper house of the congress. Scope here lies mostly in applying
the knowledge and the robots to a similar scenario that has not yet
been contemplated.
Adaptation happens when contexts are different or if the purpose
changes. OSA has ambitious aims of, for example, expanding be-
yond Brazil to impact ‘a billion people in 10 years’ (P2). The purpose
would still be the same, one of auditing public expenses to empower
political participation. On one hand, they would need to understand
specific, contextual characteristics and nuances, since needs, legisla-
tion and socio-political behaviours vary across jurisdictions. On the
other hand, their AI solutions and a growing international commu-
nity of programmers already mobilized through open-code plat-
forms can be used as a starting point. Likewise, if a new community,
independent from OSA, aims to apply AI, either in Brazil or else-
where, with the goal of promoting political empowerment through
approaches other than via auditing public expenses, it can also adapt
OSA’s approach by building upon their materials, codes, and
knowledge.
Finally, the OSA team has identified that the project has a great
capacity as regards spilling-over practices of governments and com-
panies alike. Governmental agencies, for instance, can start deploy-
ing AI internally to audit public expenses and enhance their
investigative capacity. As highlighted by P2, robots are more effi-
cient than people at performing a variety of tasks, and there should
be room in governments ‘to allow robots to replace some of their
established processes, so long as the codes are open and fully trans-
parent’. Companies can also learn from OSA’s experiences to de-
velop AI technologies with a wide variety of profitable purposes,
such as marketing new solutions, optimizing operations, and report-
ing more transparently to shareholders and stakeholders.
5. Final remarks
We cannot fully predict whether the development of AI-based tech-
nologies will radically change the existing political paradigm, easing
a shift towards a Direct Democracy or other unforeseen form of
political participation. Neither can we divine what the potentially
deleterious impacts of their diffusion might be. However, it seems
clear that AI developments can and should be deployed to enable
more diffused forms of political participation, empowering citizens
to take more ownership of public administration.
The emerging context of governmental open-data and online
open-source repositories for coding projects are likely suited to en-
able the proliferation of AI-based technologies for political em-
powerment. Together, they can enable civil society to participate in
political affairs without requiring physical groupings of individuals.
Citizens can thus become more politically active than by merely
choosing representatives, instead monitoring activity and pressing
for desired changes in public administration.
Our multi-method approach revealed that the literature is still
very nascent. A sample of 721 publications was covered, first
through a bibliometric analysis that was particularly focused on the
evolution of the field over time, the geographic dispersal of publica-
tions and the main areas of coverage. This was followed by system-
atically reviewing the entire documents of the articles that
mentioned politics in their keywords, and the abstracts of the re-
mainder. It became clear that nothing has been academically
reported on how society can use AI to promote political
participation.
We then proceeded to analyse an insightful case through an ex-
ploratory, qualitative approach. This stage revealed a framework
for how civil society can use AI to nurture diffused political partici-
pation. Its components arose from the experiences and expertise of
those involved with OSA, crosschecked and enriched by the litera-
ture on system change, innovation, and political science summarized
in Section 2. This framework consists of six focal areas: namely,
funding, governance, human resources, operations, public relations,
and scaling-up. Their respective dominant traits and descriptive fea-
tures were scrutinized and discussed, aiming at contributing to guid-
ing academic studies, as well as civil society endeavours.
Finally, the limitations of this work derive from the methodo-
logical approaches employed. The systematic review of academic lit-
erature exclusively used the database Web of Science for data
collection. Consequently, potentially interesting articles might not
have been included in our sample. At this stage, we also ignored
non-academic articles, which can be particularly insightful for emer-
gent topics. Our qualitative approach, on the other hand, was very
exploratory and epistemologically inductive. That means we focused
on exploring the whole of the case—instead of validating or testing
its parts for generalizability—and our sample was thus small, but
analysed in depth (Yin, 2008).
Besides building upon our research to validate our findings,
there is a wide range of opportunities for future research in this
area. Of these, we believe the following should be encouraged
as being particularly critical to the progress of literature and
practice:
i. What changes is AI likely to cause for public bureaucracies,
including (but not restricted to) job losses?
ii. What are the main challenges and bottlenecks constraining civil
society from organizing itself to deploy AI for political
participation?
iii. What forms of political participation are best with AI? What
forms are not well-suited?
iv. Does civil society desire all kinds of political participation?
v. What are the impacts of AI-based technologies on secrecy and
national security?
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